The growing popularity of social networks has generated interesting data management and data mining problems. An important concern in the release of these data for study is their privacy, since social networks usually contain personal information. Simply removing all identifiable personal information (such as names and social security number) before releasing the data is insufficient. It is easy for an attacker to identify the target by performing different structural queries. In this paper we propose k-automorphism to protect against multiple structural attacks and develop an algorithm (called KM) that ensures k-automorphism. We also discuss an extension of KM to handle "dynamic" releases of the data. Extensive experiments show that the algorithm performs well in terms of protection it provides.
INTRODUCTION
Social network applications, such as hi5 (hi5.com), facebook (facebook.com), and myspace (myspace.com), have become popular for sharing information. As a consequence, the amount of social network data has grown rapidly, and this offers rich opportunities for data mining and analysis, for example, to find community groups and their evolution [2, 10] . However, social network data usually contain users' private information; it is important to protect these information in any sharing and mining activities. There are well-known examples of unintended release of private information in released (also called published) data, causing organizations to become increasingly conservative in releasing these data sets. Realization of the promise of social networks requires addressing these concerns. Before publishing all these data for analysis, data mining, and other purposes, it is necessary to ensure that the published data will not contain any private information. * This work was partially done when the first author was visiting University of Waterloo as a visiting scholar. The first author was partially supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 70771043. The second author was supported by Hong Kong RGC GRF 611608 and NSFC/RGC Joint Research Scheme N HKUST602 /08. The third author was supported by National Science and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada.
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In this paper, we focus on the "identity disclosure" problem [13] , which is one possible privacy leak concern when a social network is published. Formally, given a published social network G * , if an adversary can locate the target entity t as a vertex v of G * with a high probability, we say that the identity of t is disclosed. A naive anonymization method would remove all identifiable personal information before publishing the network, such as names and social security numbers (SSN). However, even when a network is published without any identity information, it is still possible to locate the target with a high probability based on some structural information around the target [7] . In fact, once it can be determined that a published vertex v of G * corresponds to target t, all sensitive attributes associated with v can be recognized as t's private information. In other words, all the private information about t is released to the adversary. Moreover, based on disclosed identities, some sensitive link information can be easily derived as well. For example, if we can locate two targets t1 and t2 in G * , it is straightforward to figure out whether there is an edge between t1 and t2. The relationship between t1 and t2 may be sensitive and private. Therefore, "identity disclosure" is a critical factor to consider in publishing privacy-preserved network data.
In order to identify private information in released data, an adversary usually launches different queries using some background knowledge. For example, in tabular data publication, the quasiidentifier attributes (the minimal set of attributes that can be joined with external information to re-identify individual records) can be used as background knowledge. Similarly, any topological structure of the network can be utilized to identify the target in the released network. There can be four types of structural attacks in this environment [7, 23, 13] : degree-attack, sub-graph attack, 1-neighbor-graph attack, and hub-fingerprint-attack. We discuss these in detail in Section 2; the following example demonstrates the problem using one of these types. Example 1. Given the social network G in Figure 1a , its naive anonymized version G (Figure 1b) obtained by removing all individuals' names. We assume that the target entity is Bob. Note that, the numbers beside vertices in Figure 1 are not vertex labels, but vertex IDs that we introduce to simplify description. From Figure  1b , we can observe that if we know that Bob has four neighbors (i.e. degree attack), we can uniquely identify that Bob is vertex 7 in G . 2 This simple example shows that a naive privacy-preserving published network (one where the identities are removed) is still susceptible to these structural attacks. A number of recent works study privacy-preserving network publication [7, 23, 13] . However, these suffer from the following limitations.
1) All but one [7] of the proposals consider only a single type of attack [23, 13] . Furthermore, we do not know of any technique that can guarantee the privacy of a released network under a subgraph attack (1-neighbor sub-graph attack [23] is a special case of sub-graph attack). In practice, it is not realistic to assume that an attacker would launch only one type of attack (i.e. an adversary has only one type of structural information about the target). One has to assume that there will be simultaneous multiple attacks and the techniques need to be resilient to all of them.
2) The only solution that can handle multiple attacks [7] introduces considerable uncertainty into released networks. Since the released network only contains a summary of structural information about the original network, users have to generate some random sample instances of the released network for further analysis. The samples come from a large number of possible worlds, which introduces much uncertainty, making subsequent analysis difficult.
3) Existing methods do not consider dynamic releases. This is important in evolutionary networks and dynamic social network analysis [2, 10] . For example, given a series of online trading networks, such as eBay, based on community evolution in these networks, we can predict the trend of consumers' purchasing behavior. These applications require republishing data periodically to support dynamic analysis. However, all existing privacy-preserving network publication methods consider only "one-time" release. Even though each released network G * t at time Tt can guarantee privacy individually, an adversary can still identify the target with a high probability by collecting the information from multiple releases.
Considering the above limitations, we propose a systematic method for privacy-preserving publishing of social network data. The technique has three advantages.
1) It can guarantee privacy under any structural attack. In our method, we do not assume one type of attack. We assume that an adversary can have complete information about the target, such as degree, neighbors, shortest-distances from hubs and so on. Our method can guarantee privacy, even though an adversary can launch multiple and different types of structural attacks.
2) The released network has no uncertainty. The released network generated by our method can provide not only a summary of the structural information regarding the whole network, but also structural information about each individual vertex.
3) It can guarantee privacy under dynamic releases. Even though an adversary can have historical information about the target, the target cannot be identified in our released networks.
The intuition of our proposed method is the following: Assume that there are k-1 automorphic functions Fa (a=1,...,k-1) in the released network G * ,and for each vertex v, Fa 1 (v) = Fa 2 (v) (a1 = a2). Thus, for each vertex v in G * , there are always k-1 other symmetric vertices. This means that there are no structural differences between v and each of its k-1 symmetric vertices. Thus, it is not possible to distinguish v from the other k-1 symmetric vertices using any structural information. Therefore, the target cannot be identified with a probability higher than 1 k . However, finding the automorphic functions Fa is a key problem. In this paper, we develop three techniques, namely graph partitioning, block alignment and edge copy. In order to address the privacy disclosure in dynamic releases, we propose "vertex ID generation" technique. In our method, the intersection of query results in different publications of the same network G always has at least k candidates. Thus the probability of identification is kept at 1 k . In summary, we make the following contributions:
1. We propose a systematic method to protect the released social network data from all structural attacks. Specifically, we propose an algorithm to convert original network G into kautomorphic network G * , which is then released. 2. We consider dynamic releases of networks. In order to avoid privacy disclosure in re-publication of networks, we propose vertex ID generation technique. 3. Extensive experiments and comparisons show the superiority of our methods. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Background knowledge and related work are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 covers the k-automorphism model. We propose KM algorithm in Section 4. The privacy protection in dynamic releases is discussed in Section 5. We evaluate our method in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORK
We first briefly review the terminology that we will use in this paper. Note that, for ease of presentation, we use the terms "graph" and "network" interchangeably, as well as the terms "release" and "publish". Table I lists the symbols used in this paper. For most of the paper, we only consider non-labeled networks. A network V, E is defined in the usual manner, where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges. The definition of a query Q in this paper is restricted. Obviously, an attacker can also launch a query Q based on non-structural information (such as vertex label) to identify the target. In this paper, we only consider structural attacks. Four types of structural attacks have been identified in network data publication [7, 23, 13] . We illustrate these attacks through Figures 1 and 2. 1) Degree Attack. Assume that an adversary knows that Bob has four neighbors. According to the released network in Figure 1b , the adversary can identify Bob uniquely, since only vertex 7's degree is four. Vertex refinement attack [7] is a generalized type of degree attack. It assumes that an adversary can know the number of the target's n-hop neighbors, where n ≥ 1. Assume that an adversary knows that query Q4 (in Figure 2d ) exists around Bob, and vertex I in Q4 corresponds to Bob (as in Figure 1 , Roman numerals beside vertices in Figure 2 are vertex IDs, not vertex labels). Since there is only one match of Q4 in the released network, Bob can be uniquely identified.
3) 1-Neighbor-Graph Attack. Assume that an adversary knows Bob's neighbors, and the connections among Bob and his neighbors, which is denoted by Q1 in Figure 2a . There is only one match of Q1 in the released network. Thus, Bob's privacy will be compromised. As noted earlier, 1-neighbor-graph attack is a special case of sub-graph attack.
4) Hub Fingerprint Attack. Assume that some hub vertices have been identified in the released network. If an adversary knows the distances between Bob and these hubs, Bob may also be identified.
Information Loss and Utility
In privacy preserving data publishing, it is necessary to balance usually conflicting concerns: privacy protection and information loss. Before we discuss our method in detail, we first propose measures of information loss and utility that we employ. In this work, we use the anonymization cost to quantify information loss. DEFINITION 2.6. Anonymization Cost. Given an original network G and its anonymized version G * , the anonymization cost in G * is defined as
The rationale of using anonymization cost to measure the information loss in G * is that a lower anonymization cost indicates that fewer changes have been made to the original graph G. Furthermore, some techniques also use statistical network measures to evaluate the utility of released network [23, 13, 7] , such as degree difference, average shortest-paths and cluster coefficient. We also use these statistical measures in our experiments.
Related Work
Privacy-preserving data publication has received increasing interest in database community [7, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 9, 14, 6, 4, 3] . Most previous work focus on tabular-data publication. With the increasing popularity of social network applications, analysis of these data has also started to attract attention. How to publish social network data for data mining and analysis without leaking any privacy information is an interesting problem that has been studied [7, 13, 23, 1, 5, 8, 21] .
A number of recent works study privacy-preserving network publication [7, 13, 23] . As noted earlier, all of these except one [7] assume that an adversary launches only one type of attack. For example, Zhou and Pei study how to protect released networks from 1-neighbor-graph attack [23] , and degree attack is addressed by Liu and Terzi in [13] . However, in practice, an attacker can launch multiple attacks to identify the target and the techniques need to be resilient in the face of multiple attacks.
As an example, given an original network G in Figure 1a , according to existing methods [23, 13] , we get an anonymized networkĜ in Figure 1c . InĜ, there are always at least 2 vertices whose degrees are d, for any d. Furthermore, for any vertex v and its 1-neighbor graph N G(v), there always exists another vertex v , whose 1-neighbor graph N G(v ) is isomorphic to N G(v). Consequently,Ĝ can guarantee privacy under both degree attack and 1-neighbor sub-graph attack. However, if we know that query Q4 (Figure 2d ) exists around target Bob, Bob's identity will still be compromised, since there is only one match of Q4 inĜ.
Hay et al. [7] propose "automorphically equivalent" and discuss multiple attacks. However, the solution introduces considerable uncertainty in released networks. Given the same original network G in Figure 1a , according to their graph generalization method, G is partitioned into two blocks. Each block is condensed into one super node, and the edges between two blocks are condensed into super edges, as shown in Figure 3 . The number of edges in the super node X is denoted as X's weight d(X, X), and the number of edges between X and Y is denoted as the super edge (X, Y )'s weight d(X, Y ). Although this method can guarantee privacy in the released network, there is much uncertainty in the released network. Since users cannot know the structural information in each supernode, they need to generate samples of the super-graph for further analysis. Authors point out that the number of possible worlds for samples is:
Obviously, the large number of possible worlds (|W (G)|) introduces much uncertainty in the released network, which complicates the use of the released data. It also leads to large information loss, such as structural information about each vertex in original networks. Besides identity disclosure that we focus on, protecting sensitive links among the individuals in the anonymized social network has also received attention. Ying and Wu in [21] study how anonymization algorithms that are based on randomly adding and removing edges change the spectrum of the network. The "link-disclosure" problem they define is orthogonal to "identity disclosure" problem discussed in this paper. Frikken and Golle [5] study how to protect privacy, if a group of authorities can jointly reconstruct a entire graph G by assembling their own pieces of G. The problem is different from ours, since we only consider centralized data publication.
K-AUTOMORPHISM
In order to guarantee privacy from any structural attack, we propose the following concept.
Obviously, if G is a k-automorphic network, for any vertex v in G, we cannot distinguish v from its k − 1 symmetric vertices based on any structural information. Thus, an adversary cannot identify v from G with a probability higher than 1 k . Therefore, the problem that we want to solve in this paper is defined as follows:
Given an original network G, find a network
We require that G is a sub-graph of G * . Thus, all link information in the original network G should be preserved in its anonymized version G * . Furthermore, in order to minimize anonymization cost (Definition 2.6), and to ensure that the anonymized network is as similar to the original as possible, we require that |E(
where |E(G)| is the set of edges in graph G.
In this paper, we propose a systematic method to convert a social network G into a k-automorphic network G * . Although our method addresses all structural attacks, for clarity, we only use subgraph attack as an example to show how we protect the privacy in released network data. We prove in Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 that the released network G * produced by our algorithm is k-automorphic, which can resist any structural attack.
Given a sub-graph query Q, if there are k (k > 1) matches of Q, no adversary can identify the target uniquely. Recall Example 1, where a naive anonymized network G was generated by removing all names from the original network G (Figure 1b) . Given a sub-graph Q2 in Figure 2b , there are two matches in G . Thus, using query Q2, an attacker cannot identify Bob uniquely. However, k-match is not sufficient to avoid identity disclosure. If these k matches have some shared vertices, the privacy associated with the shared vertices may still be compromised. For example, an adversary may know that query Q3 in Figure 2c exists around Bob. There are eight matches of Q3 in the social network G : (7, 6, 9, 8, 1, 5), (7, 6, 9, 8, 5, 1) , (7, 6, 8, 9, 1, 5) , (7, 6, 8, 9, 5, 1) , (7, 6, 10, 8, 1, 5) , (7, 6, 10 , 8, 5, 1) , (7, 6, 8, 10, 1, 5) and (7, 6, 8, 10, 5, 1) . However, these eight matches have the shared match vertices (i.e. vertices 6,7 in G ) with regard to vertex I and II in query Q3. As shown in Figure 2c , vertex I corresponds to target Bob in query Q3. In this case, although Q3 has eight matches, an adversary can still identify Bob in G uniquely. To overcome the limits of k-match, we define the concept of different matches as follows: Consider two matches m1 = (7, 6, 9, 8, 1, 5) and m2 = (7, 6, 9, 8, 5, 1) of query Q3 in Figure 2c . For vertex I in query Q3, the match vertices of vertex I in m1 and m2 are both vertex 7 in G . Thus, m1 and m2 are NOT different. On the other hand, for two matches m3 = (7, 6, 9, 10, 8) and m4 = (4, 5, 1, 2, 3) of query Q2, there exists no vertex v (in query Q2) whose match vertices in m1 and m2 are identical. Thus, these two matches are different.
Therefore, in order to avoid identifying the target from the released network G * , we propose k-different match principle. 
K-MATCH (KM) ALGORITHM
Obviously, if a released network G * satisfies k-different match principle, given any sub-graph query Q, no adversary can identify the target with a probability higher than 1 k . In this section, we propose our algorithm to find an anonymized network G * that satisfies k-different match principle. We also prove that G * obtained by our algorithm is a k-automorphic network and G is a sub-graph of G * . Thus, G * can guarantee privacy under any structural attack.
Overview
We illustrate the main ideas of KM algorithm using Figure 4 . Assume that we need to guarantee that the released network G * satisfies 2-different match (i.e. k =2). First, we partition the original network G into 2 blocks, P11 and P12, as shown in Figure 4b . Then, we perform graph alignment on P11 and P12 to obtain two alignment blocks P 11 and P 12 (adding edge (2, 4)), where P 11 is isomorphic to P 12 . The details of graph alignment are discussed shortly. Obviously, if a match of query Q is contained in alignment block P 11 (or P 12 ), it must also be contained in the other alignment block P 12 (or P 11 ). This means that, if a match of query Q can be contained in some block of the anonymized network G * , there must exist at least 2 matches of Q in G * . However, the anonymized network after graph partition and alignment is still insufficient to satisfy the k-different match principle. For example, given query Q4 in Figure 2d , there is still only one match of Q4 in the anonymized network in Figure 1b . This is because the match crosses two blocks. In order to handle the problem, we propose the "edge-copy" technique (Section 4.3).
Block
Since block P 11 is isomorphic to P 12 under function f , for each vertex v in P 11 , there exists a corresponding vertex f (v) in P 12 .
There is a crossing edge between vertex 1 (in block P 11 ) and vertex 6 (in block P 12 ) in Figure 4b ; thus, we need to introduce another edge between vertex f (1) (that is vertex 9 in block P 12 ) and f −1 (6) (that is vertex 5 in block P 11 ). Figure 4c shows the anonymized network after edge-copy. Given the same query Q4, there are two matches m1 = (7, 6, 9, 10, 8, 1, 5) and m2 = (4, 5, 1, 3, 2, 9, 6). Although these two matches have some shared vertices, they correspond to different vertices in query Q. Thus, according to Definition 3.2, these two matches are different.
The K-Match algorithm (KM for short) in Algorithm 1 implements the approach we propose. We start by removing all identity information from the original network G resulting in the naive anonymized network G (line 1 in Algorithm 1). We then partition G into n blocks and cluster these blocks into m groups Ui, (i = 1, ..., m), where each group Ui has at least k blocks (line 2). For each group, we perform graph alignment (we also use the term "block alignment" interchangeably) to obtain alignment blocks (lines 3-4). We replace original blocks by alignment blocks to obtain network G (line 5). Then, we perform edge-copy to get G * (line 6), which is reported as the anonymized network (line 7). The details of each step will be discussed shortly.
Obviously, different partitionings of the original network G and different block clusterings lead to different released networks G * and different anonymization costs. We delay the discussion of finding a "good" partitioning and block clustering to minimize anonymization cost until Section 4.4.
According to KM Algorithm, each group Ui has ki blocks, where ki ≥ k. For ease of presentation and without loss of generality, we assume in the remainder that each group has exactly k blocks.
Algorithm 1 K-Match (KM) Algorithm
Require: Input: An original graph G and the parameter k.
Output: The anonymized network G * , which is a k-auto-morphism network.
1: Generate G by removing all identity information from G. 2: Partition G into n blocks and cluster the blocks into m groups U i , 
Block (Graph) Alignment
For each group Ui that is obtained following partitioning and clustering, we perform graph alignment operations on all blocks Pij in Ui. Specifically, each block Pij is transformed into alignment block P ij , where all P ij are isomorphic to each other. Furthermore, Pij is a sub-graph of P ij . Example 2. We illustrate Definition 4.1 using Figure 5 . The naive anonymized network G in Figure 4a is partitioned into 2 blocks P11 and P12, which are clustered into one group U1. Figure  5 shows a graph alignment between two blocks P11 and P12 (note the addition of edge (2, 4) in P 11 in order to get graph isomorphism between P 11 and P 12 ). Since P 11 is isomorphic to P 12 , for each vertex v in P 11 (or P 12 ), there exists a symmetric vertex u in P 12 (or P 11 ). Therefore, each (v, u) is an alignment vertex instance I. Note that in this example, k = 2; thus, each vertex v has one symmetric vertex in the other block. Figure 5 shows AVT, which contains all alignment vertex instances. PROOF. (Sketch) Minimal graph edit distance problem can be reduced to finding the optimal alignment. The former is a classical NP-hard problem [22] .
Due to the hardness of block alignment, we propose an heuristic algorithm (Algorithm 2) to find a good alignment (not necessarily optimal) for k blocks in one group Ui. At the beginning of Algorithm 2, we call Algorithm 3 to build the AVT, which contains all alignment vertex instances. According to AVT, for each vertex v, we can find k − 1 symmetric vertices in the other k − 1 blocks. If there is an edge between v1 and v2 in a certain block Pij, we need to introduce an edge between v1's symmetrical vertices and v2's symmetrical vertices in the other k − 1 alignment blocks in the same group Ui.
Thus, the key problem is how to build AVT. Given a group Ui with blocks Pij, j = 1, ..., k, Algorithm 3 implements our approach. Initially, we find k vertices vij from k blocks Pij respectively, which have the same vertex degrees d. If there are multiple choices for d, we choose d with the largest value. If there is no vertex in one block Pij with the same degree as the selected vertices in the other blocks, we choose a vertex with the largest degree in Pij. The set of these k vertices form the initial alignment vertex instance. We next perform breath-first search starting from vij in each block Pij in parallel. During this process, we always pair up k vertices (in k blocks Pij respectively) with similar degrees. For some vertex vij in Pij, if we cannot find the corresponding vertex in the other blocks, we will introduce a dummy vertex, which has the same label as the corresponding vertex. Finally, we get an AVT containing all alignment vertex instances.
The number of the iterations between lines 3-5 in Algorithm 2 depends on the total number edges in blocks Pij, j = 1, ..., ki. Thus, time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O( 6: Report AV T .
BFS search time complexity in block Pij is O(|E(Pij)|+|V (Pij)|), the time complexity of Algorithm 3 is O(M ax(|E(Pij)|+|V (Pij)|)).
After graph alignment, we replace each block Pij in naive anonymized network G (line 5 in Algorithm 1) by its alignment block P ij . In this way, we can obtain an anonymized network G . Obviously, given a sub-graph query Q, if a match of Q is contained in a certain block P ij , Q is also contained in the other k − 1 alignment blocks in the same group Ui. This means that Q has at least k different matches in G . As discussed in Section 4.1, the anonymized network G after graph partition and block alignment still compromises some privacy. For example, if all matches of query Q crosses at least two blocks, we cannot guarantee that G satisfies the k-different match principle. Consider G in Figure 4b that is obtained after block alignment. Query Q4 in Figure 2d has only one match in G . Thus, G does not satisfy 2-different match principle. This can be addressed by the edge-copy technique that is described in the next section.
Edge Copy
According to line 2 in Algorithm 1, there are m groups Ui, i = 1, ..., m. For each group Ui, after block alignment, we have k alignment blocks P ij , (j = 1, ..., k). Furthermore, according to Algorithm 3, each group Ui has an AVT Ai. Union of Ai, i = 1, ..., m, are collected to form the overall AVT for the whole graph.
The next step is to process the crossing edges between two blocks in G . As discussed in Section 1, the intuition behind our work is to find k-1 automorphic functions Fa. According to these functions, we can convert the original graph G into a k-automorphic graph G * , which guarantees privacy under any structural attack. We define function Fa (a = 1, ..., k − 1) based on AVT. We treat alignment vertex instance I in AVT as a circularly-linked list. Specifically, we use I.at(a) to denote the a-th vertex in instance I. We define v.next=I.at(a + 1), if a ≤ |I| − 1; else v.next = I.at (1) , where |I| is the number of vertices in I. Fa (a = 1, ..., k − 1) is defined as follows:
DEFINITION 4.3. For each vertex v, we assume that v is in the instance I in AVT. v's automorphic function
We illustrate Fa using Figure 5 . Since k=2 in Figure 5 , each instance has two vertices, and we have one automorphic function. Thus, F1(1) = 9 and F1(9) = 1. Similarly, for vertex 4, F1(4) = 7 and F1(7) = 4.
In order to guarantee k-automorphism under functions Fa, we need to "copy" crossing edges which are defined as follows.
DEFINITION 4.4. Boundary Vertex and Crossing Edge. Given a vertex v in a block P , v is a boundary vertex if and only if v has at least one neighbor vertex that is outside of block P . An edge e = (v, u) is called a crossing edge if and only if v and u are boundary vertices in two different blocks.
Assume that there is a crossing edge e = (v1, u1). According to alignment functions, we introduce k − 1 edges between k − 1 pairs (Fa(v1), Fa(u1)) (a = 1, . .., k − 1). For example, there is a crossing edge (1, 6) in G in Figure 4b . Since k = 2, we introduce another edge between (F1(1), F1 (6)) (i.e. (9, 5) ). This results in the network G * (Figure 4c ), which satisfies 2-different match principle. Note that, if there exists an edge between Fa(v1) and Fa(u1) in the original network G, we will not introduce an extra edge (Fa(v1), Fa(u1)).
Algorithm 4 Edge Copy Algorithm
Require: Input: The original network: G; The network after graph partition and block alignment: G ; Alignment Vertex Table: AVT Output: The anonymized network G * . 
There are O(|E(G)|) edges to be copied. Thus, the number of iterations of lines 2-3 in Algorithm 4 is O(|E(G)|). Therefore, the time complexity of Algorithm 4 is O(|E(G)|).

Graph Partitioning
Algorithm 1 relies on the partitioning of the naive anonymized network G into n blocks that are clustered into m groups Ui, (i = 1, ..., m). As noted earlier, different partitionings and block clusterings will lead to different anonymization cost Cost(G, G * )(defined in Definition 2.6).
In this section, we discuss how to find a good graph partitioning and block clustering to minimize
indicates the number of edges introduced by the KM algorithm. According to KM, we introduce edges in both block alignment (Algorithm 2) and edge copy (Algorithm 4). The effect of graph partitioning is quite difficult to quantify. For example, if we partition G into fewer blocks, there are fewer crossing edges to be copied. On the other hand, fewer blocks imply that the size of each block is large. Thus, we need to introduce more edges to perform block alignment. The optimal graph partitioning of G implies that KM algorithm can produce a released network G * where |E(G * ) − E(G)| is minimal. Finding the optimal graph partitioning is NP-complete, since we can reduce a NP-complete problem (graph partition with min-cut) to this problem. Thus, we instead propose a heuristic partitioning algorithm. Theorem 4.2 shows the relationship between Cost(G, G * ) and graph partitioning and block clustering. DEFINITION 4.5. Given a group Ui with blocks Pij, j = 1, ..., k, anonymization cost of group Ui is defined as follows: 
3:
The set of all blocks P ij from one group U i . 4: repeat 5:
6:
for each block P ij in U i do
7:
Expand block P ij by one hop.
8:
The set of expanded blocks form group U i .
9: until Cost(U
Algorithm 5 implements our graph partitioning and block clustering. First, we find all frequent sub-graphs R = {g f } in naive anonymized network G by setting min sup = k. Then, we choose the frequent sub-graph g f with the largest number of edges in R. The rationale behind the choice is that we want to partition G into as few blocks as possible in order to minimize the number of crossing edges. All of g f 's matches are extracted from G as the initial blocks (line 2). These blocks are clustered to one group Ui (lines 3,5). The blocks in group Ui are denoted as Pij. It is straightforward to see AlCost(Ui) = 0, since these blocks are isomorphic to each other. If a vertex v is contained in more than one block (v is randomly arranged into one of them), we need to introduce dummy vertices for alignment, in which case AlCost(Ui) = 0. However, AlCost(Ui) is still small, since these blocks have high structural similarity. According to Definition 4.5, we can get Cost(Ui) at this moment. Then, we expand all Pij in parallel. Let neighbor Pij denote all vertices that are one hop from boundary vertices in Pij. All vertices in N eighbor(Pij) are inserted into Pij (line 7). If a vertex v is contained in more than one N eighbor(Pij), v is randomly inserted into one of them. We align the new inserted vertices from each block Pij by degree similarity. We may need to introduce dummy vertices in the process. After expansion, AlCost(U i ) increases, since we need to introduce edges to align the new merged vertices. If all updated blocks Pij have fewer crossing edges than the original blocks, the number of introduced edges during edge copy will decrease. Block expansion continues if the overall group cost Cost(Ui) decreases. Otherwise, it stops (Line 9). We remove all blocks Pij in Ui from the naive anonymized network G (line 11), i.e, G = G − Ui. Note that, we choose 'edge-based' partitioning. Specifically, all crossing edges of block Pij are chosen as 'separator' to separate Pij from other parts of G.
We then iterate the above process until |E(G )| = 0 (line 11). Note that G is a non-labeled graph; thus, we always find frequent sub-graphs if |E(G )| ≥ k. In the last iteration, the frequent subgraph may be an edge or an isolated vertex.
Finally, G is partitioned into n blocks which are clustered into m groups Ui. Each group Ui has at least k blocks.
Analysis and Discussion
Although we illustrate our methods only using sub-graph attacks, we prove that network G * released by the KM algorithm is a k-automorphic network, which can guarantee privacy under any structural attack as defined in Definition 2.5. PROOF. According to Lemma 4.1, we can find k automorphism in G * . Thus, for each vertex v in G * , there always exist k-1 symmetric vertices. We cannot distinguish v from its other k-1 symmetric vertices based on any structural information. Therefore, for any structural query, the released network G * produced by KM algorithm always contains at least k symmetric vertices, or contains null. Thus, an adversary cannot identify the target with a probability higher than
There is a well-known trade-off between "privacy" and "accuracy" for all anonymization techniques. As the network is modified to achieve anonymization, it diverges from its original form due to the addition of vertices and edges. Therefore, there is a divergence of the results of an analysis on G * from that on G. This inaccuracy occurs at varying degrees. In this work, we want to preserve all edges in the original network and guarantee privacy under any (and multiple) structural attack. To achieve this, KM algorithm introduces new edges. Actually, according to KM algorithm, the number of edges that we introduce to achieve k-automorphism is bounded to (k − 1) * |V (E)|, where |V (E)| is the number of edges in the original graph G.
There exist many non-trivial automorphism partitions of vertices in real networks [20] . "Automorphism partition" is similar to the concept of "AVI" (Definition 4.1) in our paper. An AVI is an "automorphism partition" with no less than k vertices. Essentially, it is only necessary to insert noisy edges to handle "automorphism partition" with fewer than k vertices. The high symmetry property [20, 12, 17] of real networks guarantees that KM algorithm introduces fewer noisy edges to satisfy k-automorphism model and the worst case bound is unlikely to be reached.
In theory aspect, the utility of KM algorithm depends on how symmetrical the original graphs are. If there are many automorphism partitions [20] with no fewer than k vertices in original graph, we will introduce few noisy edges. The utility of KM will be good in this case; otherwise, the utility will degrade. Many real networks are known to have high symmetry property [20, 12, 17] .
DYNAMIC RELEASES
So far, we only consider "one-time" release of network data. However, this is not satisfactory for evolutionary networks and dynamic social network analysis [2, 10] . In these cases, it is necessary to re-publish network data periodically. This poses additional challenges. Specifically, even though each publication may satisfy k-automorphism, an adversary can still identify the target with a high probability when a sequence of releases of the network are analyzed together. Therefore, to support dynamic network analysis, it is necessary to be able to find connection between multiple releases of the network while ensuring privacy (specifically, the enforcement of k-automorphism) in these releases. These goals are usually conflicting and introduce complications.
Example 3 As shown in Figure 6 , given a social network G, we need to publish G at times T1 and T2. According to KM algorithm, we get two released networks at times T1 and T2, denoted as G * 1 and G * 2 , respectively. Although both G * 1 and G * 2 individually satisfy 2-automorphism, an adversary can still identify target Bob uniquely. Assume that an adversary knows that sub-graph Q4 (see Figure 2d ) exists around target Bob at both time T1 and T2. According to sub-graph attack Q4 at time T1, an adversary knows that there are two candidates vertices {4, 7} for Bob in G * 1 . Similarly, at time T2, there are still two candidates {2, 7} for Bob. Since Bob exists at both T1 and T2, it is straightforward to determine that vertex 7 corresponds to Bob.
To remedy the above problem, a naive method is to remove all vertex IDs, or permute vertex IDs randomly (namely, a given vertex 
Vertex ID Generalization
For ease of presentation, in this subsection, we assume that there are no vertex insertions or deletions in different releases of the network. This means that the set of all vertex IDs remains unchanged in different publications of the same network.
Recall that we define (t = 1, ..., s) , a vertex v cannot be identified with a probability higher than 1 k , if the following holds:
We illustrate Lemma 5.1 by Example 3 in Figure 7 , where k = 2. For vertex 1, according to AVT A1 and A2, F1(1) = {9} in both G 1 k , if the following holds:
where
Lemma 5.2 shows the intuition of the proposed "vertex ID generalization" method in dynamic releases. First, we illustrate our method through Example 3. Assume that we have obtained 2-automorphic networks G * 1 and G * 2 produced by KM algorithm (Figure 6 ) along with AVT A1 and A2 (Figure 7) . Based on A1, we can define k − 1 automorphic functions in G * is assigned a generalized vertex ID (see generalized vertex ID table GIDT in Figure 7 ). For each record r in GIDT, r.OriID is its original vertex ID, and r.GenID is its generalized vertex ID. Initially, each generalized vertex ID has only one element, that is r.GenID = {r.OriID}. In order to protect released networks in dynamic releases, we perform the following vertex ID generalization process. We know Res(7, G * 1 ) = {4, 7} and Res(7, G * 2 ) = {2, 7}. In order to avoid the disclosure of vertex 7, according to Lemma 5.2, we need to guarantee that Res (7, G In Section 2.2, we stated that we use anonymization cost to measure the information loss. In fact, the anonymization cost can nicely estimate the structural information loss since it counts the number of edges that we change before and after anonymization. However, the anonymization cost is not suitable for measuring the information loss of vertex ID generation, since this generalization relates to the content of a vertex ID. 
Proof is based on Algorithm 6. Due to space limitation, we omit the details. The above theorem implies that the information loss in dynamic releases can be controlled by k.
Vertex Insertion and Deletion
In practice, some vertex insertions and deletions will occur in different publications G * t . If an adversary knows that the target exists in G * 1 but not in G * 2 , it is easy to identify the target. We propose the following techniques to handle this problem. There are two cases: 1) (Deletion) There is a vertex ID v that exists in G * 
PROOF. Proof is based on our insertion and deletion method. Due to space limitation, we omit the details. Usually, in evolutionary networks and dynamic social network analysis, the number of inserted and deleted vertices (i.e. |Ins| and |Del|) is very small, compared with the number of vertices in the original network (i.e. |V (G * 1 )|).
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate our methods using both synthetic and real data sets, and compare them with the existing state-of-theart techniques, such as k-degree anonymity [13] , 1-neighborhooddiversity [23] and graph generalization method [7] . These methods are denoted as "Against-Degree" [23] , "Against-1Neighbor" [13] and "Generalization" [7] respectively. All of the methods have been implemented using standard C++. The experiments are conducted on a P4 3.0GHz machine of 1G RAM running Windows XP. Erdos Renyi Model: This is a classical random graph model. It defines a random graph as N vertices connected by M edges that are chosen randomly from the N (N − 1)/2 possible edges. In our experiments, we set N =1000 and M =5000. This dataset is denoted as "ER".
Datasets
Scale-Free Model: A scale-free network is a network whose degree distribution follows a power law, at least asymptotically, i.e. for degree d, its probability density function is P (k) = d −γ . Usually, 2.0< γ <3.0. In our experiments, we set the number of vertices to be 1000 and γ=2.5. This dataset is denoted as "SF". 
Power of Privacy Protection
We evaluate released networks G * produced by the KM algorithm under different attacks. The default value of k is 10. First, for any degree d in released network G * , we report the frequency of vertices with degree d in G * . As depicted in Figure 8 , the minimal frequency is 10. This means that G * can guarantee privacy under degree attack.
We test our method in sub-graph attacks. We assume that an adversary knows some local structure around a target. We randomly extract some sub-graphs from original network G as query graphs. Figure 9 shows the number of matches of Q in released networks G * . With increasing |E(Q)| (i.e. the number of edges in Q), the number of matches decreases. When |E(Q)| > 12 in Figure 9a in Prefuse dataset, there are less than 10 matches in released networks produced by "Against-DA" and "Against-1NG". This means that there are privacy leaks in these released networks. The reason is that these two algorithms only consider a single type of attack, i.e. degree-attack or 1-neighbor-graph attack, respectively. Due to k(=10)-automorphism in our released network, given any subgraph query, the number of matches is never less than 10. We obtain similar results in co-author dataset and synthetic datasets, as shown in Figure 9 .
These results demonstrate that existing methods cannot be resilient to multiple attacks. Due to k-automorphism in our released network, an adversary cannot distinguish a vertex from the other k − 1 symmetric vertices. Thus, our method can guarantee privacy under any structural attack.
Similarly, under vertex-refinement attack in Figure 10 , our method can guarantee privacy; however, methods in [23] and [13] cannot resist vertex-refinement attack. Due to space limitation, we omit some of the results, such as the results on other datasets and the results under hub-fingerprint attacks. However, all results confirm the strong power of our privacy protection method.
We do not compare our method with graph generalization method [7] . For this method, we need to generate different sample instances from the generalized network. Individual sample instances cannot resist structural attacks. Generalization method protects the private information by introducing "uncertainty". Specifically, users cannot know which sample instance corresponds to the original network. As discussed earlier, "uncertainty" also limits its use in practice. For example, it cannot answer queries that find the shortestpath distance between two given vertices.
Utility Evaluation
We test G * produced by the KM algorithm using three statistical measures: (TDD) in Figure 11 , average shortest-path length (ASP) in Figure 12 , and average cluster co-efficient (ACC) in Figure 13 . Note that, the dashed lines in Figures 12 and 13 denote the values of ASP and ACC in original networks, which do not changes with increasing of k. We also compare the KM algorithm with the "Against-Degree" [23] , "Against-1Neighbor" [13] and "Generalization" [7] methods. We vary k from 5 to 20. In "Against-Degree", there are a number different ways to generate k-degree anonymous network. We use DP+Supergraph method, which is reported as optimal [23] . In "Generalization", we randomly generate 200 samples for utility test, which is the same as the methods in [7] .
We do not compare our method with graph generalization [7] in TDD. In graph generalization method, samples are generated based on the degree information in published generalized network. Thus, TDD in graph generalization method [7] is 0. Our method outperforms graph generalization method in the two other measures, ASP and ACC. Furthermore, the utility of the generalized network depends on the generated samples. If the samples are similar to the original network, the utility will be good. However, samples are randomly generated from a large number of possible worlds. Thus, it is difficult to generate similar samples with the original network.
As opposed to the "Against-Degree" and "Against-1Neighbor" algorithms, KM algorithm does not guarantee the best utility of released networks. For example, although TDD of KM is the least in Prefuse dataset, this not the case in co-author dataset. However, both "Against-Degree" and "Against-1Neighbor" can only re- Generally speaking, the utility value of our method is better than "Against-1Neighbor", and not as good as "Against-Degree". However, our method does not assume a single type of attack, and protects released network from multiple structural attacks. Therefore, it provides much stronger privacy protection than the others. Strong privacy protection and good utility are always conflicting goals.
Scalability Test
We test the scalability of KM algorithm in synthetic datasets. We vary |V | from 2K to 10K. The default value of k = 10. Figure 14 shows that our algorithm has good scalability.
Performance Under Dynamic Releases
We also tested our vertex ID generalization with default k = 10. Given two original networks G1 and Gt at times T1 and Tt, the change ratio α is defined as α =
|E(G(i))−E(G
. In order to generate Gt, we randomly delete 0.5 × α × |E(G 1 )| edges from G1, and then sequentially add 0.5 × α × |E(G 1 )| random edges. We vary α from 0.01 to 0.1. We define average generalized vertex ID size in Definition 5.2 to evaluate information loss in dynamic releases. The average generalized vertex ID size increases with α( Figure 15 ). We change 10% of the edges in G1, the average generalized vertex ID size is 1.93 in Prefuse data and 8.03 in coauthor data. However, the increase of average generalized vertex ID size is bounded (Theorems 5.2 and 5.4).
CONCLUSIONS
Due to increasing social network applications, privacy concerns in social networks have become increasing important. In this paper, we propose a systematic model, called k-automorphic network, to avoid identity disclosure in released networks. Given an original network G, our algorithm converts G into a k-automorphic network G * , which is then published. Our method can guarantee privacy under any structural attack. In order to support dynamic social network analysis, we also address dynamic releases of the network.
